Hillary's Bad History March 31, 2008; Page A18 No, not sniper fire in Bosnia. We're referring to Hillary Clinton's lament last week that the U.S. is flirting with a 1990s Japan-style deflation. Perhaps it's a good time to remind everyone what really happened in Japan, so Mrs. Clinton and the rest of Washington don't make the same mistakes. "I don't think we can work our way out of the problems we're in in the broad-based economy with monetary policy alone," Mrs. Clinton said in the interview with Journal reporters. "I think the Japanese tried that and tried and tried that." She added Japan should have relied more on fiscal stimulus spending and aid to banks and homeowners, which is what she wants Washington to try now. The Senator needs a refresher in Japanese economic history. Far from easing monetary policy, the Bank of Japan kept money too tight for too long in the early 1990s. Japan's stock market slide began in early 1990, but its central bank raised interest rates through most of that year and didn't cut them until July 1991. While the Bank of Japan eventually chased interest rates down to zero, it was always too late to break the deflationary spiral. There's little sign the U.S. is facing a similar danger today, given that the Federal Reserve has been dropping rates quickly as the economy has slowed. If anything, the problem is the opposite, with the Fed risking future inflation by putting rates into negative real territory and devaluing the dollar. (See Ronald McKinnon nearby.) Japan also made the mistake of refusing to make banks pay for the mistakes they made during their global lending spree in the late 1980s. As the world economy fell into recession in 1990, so did Japan. But rather than letting banks take their losses, the Liberal Democratic Party kept bailing them out. This merely delayed the day of reckoning, as insolvent banks were allowed to exist as "zombies," alive in name but unable to lend. 1 The government also raised consumption taxes, burdening consumers at exactly the wrong time. Meanwhile, with encouragement from the Clinton Treasury, Tokyo launched a vast Keynesian spending program. Roads, bridges, trains -- you name it, Japan built it. The nearby chart shows the impact this spending had on overall Japanese government debt, which exploded over the decade. The nearly annual spending programs led to several false recoveries with growth blips, but they never changed incentives enough to revive domestic risk-taking. Yet this is exactly the policy that Mrs. Clinton now wants the U.S. to emulate. Rather than let housing speculators and lenders take the hit for mispricing credit and allow the market to clear, she wants a 90-day freeze on foreclosures and a five-year freeze on mortgage resets. She also wants the feds to buy up mortgage-backed securities and guarantee troubled mortgages. Rather than let housing markets find a bottom where they can begin a recovery, she and her allies in both parties would prolong the agony. While some homeowners and banks would be saved from foreclosure or greater losses, the cost would be to lengthen the housing recession. A better model is the one the late Al Casey put into practice during the savings and loan crisis in the early 1990s. As president of the Resolution Trust Corp., Mr. Casey sold almost $400 billion of bankrupt assets as rapidly as he could. Declaring that his purpose was to "put the RTC out of business," Mr. Casey let investors buy those assets even at "vulture" prices. The real estate market was able to find a bottom, and the recovery came so fast that Bill Clinton inherited an economy that grew by 3.3% in 1992. The Beltway class also now wants to indulge in the same Keynesian "stimulus" that failed in Japan. Mrs. Clinton's "Rebuild America Plan" would invest $10 billion over 10 years in an "Emergency Repair Fund" -- a plan she claims would create 48,000 jobs for every billion dollars spent, or close to half a million jobs. She would build ports, railroads, airports, public transit, tunnels and roads. Senate Democrats are proposing more than $35 billion in new spending -- on top of their $168 billion in tax rebates. These may also lead to false recoveries, but they won't ignite a new round of risk-taking and investment. Japan finally emerged from its funk earlier this decade after it realized its bank losses and caught the updraft from global monetary reflation. Still, its economic growth remains mediocre -- a level that wouldn't be tolerated in the U.S. and may not be enough even in Japan. Sluggish growth has already sunk one Prime Minister and could prove fatal to the current leader, Yasuo Fukuda, whose approval ratings are dropping fast. The way to revive U.S. growth is by learning from Japan's mistakes, and doing the opposite. The U.S. needs monetary policy that maintains a stable price level, bank supervision that recognizes mortgage losses and lets markets clear, and marginal rate tax cuts that boost incentives to work and invest. In short, the American policies of the 1980s, not those of Japan's lost decade. |
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